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This article focuses on the role of need for cognitive closure in the process of mental model creation about social relations 
(i.e. social cliques). We assumed that high (vs. low) need for closure participants tend to rely on background category 
information when forming social cliques. We predicted that this tendency to employ categorical information as a mental 
aid, used in order to form social cliques, would be efficient in simple task structures (where category information overlaps 
with the mental model structure) but would lead to increased error rates in complex task structures (where category 
information is inconsistent with the model structure). The results confirmed our predictions, showing especially strong 
effects for the decisiveness component of need for closure. The importance of individual differences in need for closure 
and decisiveness in social reasoning is discussed.
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After years of describing our knowledge representations 
as static and fixed, social cognitive research has come 
to focus on more dynamic and flexible aspects of our 
cognition, emphasizing the constructive nature of social 
information processing (Smith, 1998; Wyer & Radvansky, 
1999; von Hecker & Sędek, 1999). In order to explain 
how people reason about the physical and social world 
and how they create meaningful cognitive representations, 
new theoretical ideas have been developed. One important 
theory that explains how we reason about novel 
situations centers around the mental model concept. 
According to this idea, knowledge representations are 
constructed actively and on-line in order to allow the 
perceiver to understand specific, real or imaginary 
situations (Johnson-Laird, 1983). New knowledge 
about the environment can be represented in the form of 
a mental model in which particular elements are related to 
each other, and can therefore be retrieved from memory 
using inferential processes. In the present research we 
focused on the role of epistemic motivation in the process 
of social mental model creation. We expected that the 
biasing impact of background categorical knowledge on 
the accuracy of reasoning about social relations should be 
moderated by individual differences in need for cognitive 
closure. 
Mental models in understanding patterns of social 
relations 
Previous research has proven that mental models help 
perceivers to organize information and understand patterns 
of social relations (Hummert, Crockett, & Kemper, 1990). 
Hummert and colleagues (1990) also examined the idea 
that balance schemas (Heider, 1958) can be used during 
reasoning about social relationships as a means to encode, 
store, and retrieve information about patterns of sentiment 
(liking vs. disliking) relationships between people. They 
concluded that perceivers sort members of small groups 
into smaller units (known as cliques); this representation 
is constructed serially at the moment of acquisition but 
once formed it is retrieved as a whole mental model. This 
means that even if the perceiver did not code a particular 
sign of relationship between two people, this piece of 
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information can be easily inferred from the constructed 
model, which specifies who belongs to which social clique. 
Further studies in this domain explored the role of logical 
inference rules in reasoning about sentiment relations. Von 
Hecker (1997) assumed that transitivity and intransitivity 
rules are used as cognitive tools in the process of constructing 
social mental models. These theoretical assumptions stem 
from Heider’s original balance principles (1958), which 
state that relations within a group must have a positivity 
value, those between groups a negativity value. Based on 
this assumption, when using transitivity rules it is possible 
to infer that if we know person A likes B and B likes C, 
then a positive relation between A and C can be inferred by 
the perceiver. The anti-transitivity rule comes into play, for 
example, when A dislikes B and B dislikes C, but A likes 
C (thus forming two cliques). It has been shown that these 
inference rules are used by people in order to construct a 
meaningful mental model of sentiment relations in small 
social groups and that contextual cues can influence this 
process (von Hecker, 1997). 
One of the important factors influencing the social 
clique model creation is the background knowledge of 
the perceiver about the type of social context in which 
the liking–disliking relations take place. Von Hecker and 
colleagues demonstrated the role of previously learned 
category distinctions in the process of learning sentiment 
relationships (von Hecker, Crockett, Hummert, & Kemper, 
1996). They found that when the information contained in 
a mental model contradicted the previously acquired social 
categorization, interference processes occurred leading to 
an impaired learning performance of new information. This 
research clearly showed that the reasoning process about 
sentiment relationships in small groups can be affected by 
other sources of information that the perceiver attends to, 
like for example their membership in social categories. 
Pursuing this line of research further, we posed the 
question of to what extent people differ in terms of how 
mental model construction processes are influenced 
by background categorical knowledge. In our previous 
research (Bukowski, von Hecker, & Kossowska, 2011) 
we applied nationality information (names of people 
belonging to a social clique) that was either a valid cue 
for the creation of an accurate social clique model (i.e. the 
mental model could be created based on a simple rule that 
people from one category like each other while those from 
different categories dislike each other) or an invalid cue 
(i.e. the liking and disliking relations between people were 
not related to their nationalities). We refer here to these 
two types of models as category consistent or category 
inconsistent models, respectively. In the research presented 
here, we additionally introduced multiply-categorizable 
targets, a condition where a second category can also 
be used in building up a social clique model (such as 
profession in addition to nationality). This condition serves 
as a more complex and ambiguous categorization setting 
and most importantly demands flexibility – prompting the 
subject to change the chosen categorization rule while task 
performance is underway.
The role of motivational and ability factors in the 
creation of social mental models
There is increasing evidence that motivational factors 
determine what type of information is attended to and 
how extensively information is processed in the course of 
creating new knowledge (see Kruglanski, 2004). Research 
on social reasoning has demonstrated that people who 
experience conditions of uncontrollability show a decreased 
ability to integrate new information into a meaningful 
mental model (von Hecker & Sędek, 1999). Knowing 
this, one could also expect that people who have a low 
motivation to deal with ambiguity and process information 
in a piecemeal fashion would also show less accuracy in the 
mental model creation process. One factor with a potential 
bearing on this issue that has not received much attention in 
understanding the creation of social mental models is need 
for cognitive closure (NFC; Kruglanski, 2004). Need for 
closure has been defined as a desire for a definite answer 
to a question, for any firm answer rather than uncertainty, 
confusion, or ambiguity (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). It 
has been described as a dispositional variable with such 
facets as decisiveness, preference for order, predictability, 
discomfort with ambiguity, and closed mindedness, as well 
as a situational variable that can be manipulated by time 
pressure, noise, or mental fatigue (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1991). According to the previous literature on the effects 
of need for closure on memory performance, people who 
score high on the need for closure scale show a preference 
for processing schema consistent information and tend to 
use more heuristic processing styles during negotiations and 
consumer decision making (de Dreu, Coole, & Oldersma, 
2009; Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & 
Schaper, 1996; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). However, 
there is not much research showing the influence of need 
for closure on reasoning and knowledge construction 
processes in the social relations domain.
In our previous research, we found that a high level of 
need for cognitive closure leads to difficulties in reasoning 
about social relations and to higher error rates in conditions 
where the construction of a mental model is inconsistent with 
the participant’s expectations (Bukowski, von Hecker, & 
Kossowska, 2011). However, it is still not clear how people 
with high vs. low need for closure build mental models in a 
situation when the rules that allow an accurate picture of the 
situation to be constructed vary in complexity and change 
over time. We assume that people with relatively high need 
for closure will construct less accurate mental models of 
social relations within a group when the categorization rule 
that divides these people into subgroups or cliques changes 
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over time. In other words, high need for closure might help 
in efficient construction of a mental model when a simple 
categorization rule is provided, but a change of the rule or 
the use of a more complex logic of inference (not based 
on any specific social category) would require a more 
flexible cognitive processing strategy, to which high need 
for closure individuals might not be able to adapt. Further 
on in this article we will focus on the issue of how social 
mental models are constructed when the perceiver already 
has some contextual information (here, about sentiment 
relationships in groups) and is asked to learn new pieces 
of information that contradict the possessed schematic 
representation. 
Thus, in this research we want to examine the role of 
need for closure in the dynamic process of forming a social 
clique model of liking or disliking relations between people 
in fictitious groups. Specifically, we are interested in the 
comparison between three types of conditions: in the first 
the accurate mental model of the situation overlaps with the 
dominant categorization cue (nationality), in the second the 
social clique model is based on a different categorization cue 
(profession), and in the third the background categorization 
is not a valid cue at all and the participant has to follow 
transitivity logic in order to build up a correct mental 
model of the relations presented. The three task conditions 
therefore impose an increasing demand on the participants 
to process the information more systematically in order to 
solve it accurately. Apart from that, the tasks are presented 
to all participants in a sequential way, so we can also observe 
how people with high vs. low NFC adapt to the change in 
categorization rules (from nationality to profession to non 
categorical rule). The sequential and dynamic aspect will 
enable us to observe the flexibility of reasoning during the 
social clique creation process. 
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) suggest that Need for 
Cognitive Closure is a unitary latent variable manifested in 
five different facets: Need for Order, Need for Predictability, 
Tolerance of Ambiguity, Closed-Mindedness, and 
Decisiveness. However, later findings have shown that 
Decisiveness is a separate dimension, differing from 
the other factors contained in Need for Closure in that 
it represents the ability to achieve cognitive closure 
(Kossowska, Van Hiel, Chun, & Kruglanski, 2002; Roets, 
Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2006; Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). For 
example, Roets and Van Hiel (2007) argue that the items 
of the Decisiveness scale largely tap into ability-related 
characteristics. For example, the items ‘When faced with 
a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly’ 
and ‘When I go shopping I have difficulty deciding exactly 
what it is I want’ (reversed item) do not seem to measure 
solely the wish to make quick decisions but also the 
perceived ability to make these decisions. Items for a need 
scale should refer only to motivation and preferences, not 
to habitual behaviors, which represent a mix of ability and 
needs. Mannetti, Pierro, Kruglanski, Taris, & Bezinovic 
(2002) conclude that ‘the specific wording of Decisiveness 
items described the ability (or lack of ability) to reach a 
decision quickly rather than the need to find an answer as 
soon as possible without too much worry about its validity 
(i.e., seizing upon the first available answer)’ (p. 153). 
In line with recent developments in the study of need 
for cognitive closure, we sought to examine two distinctive 
aspects of closure, one related to the preference for simple 
knowledge structures (related also to conservative beliefs; 
see Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003) and the other related 
to the ability to make quick decisions (represented by the 
decisiveness scale; Roets, van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2006). In 
the context of a social clique formation task that involves 
integrative, systematic processing (when no categorization 
rule is provided), the distinction between decisiveness and 
the motivation to achieve closure might be very relevant. 
By measuring these two aspects we sought to be able to 
distinguish better whether the performance level of our 
participants can be explained entirely by the differences 
in closure motivation or whether the decisiveness, ability-
related component plays an important role in the clique 
formation process as well.
Main predictions
We expected high NFC participants to exhibit lower 
performance in the condition where the liking distribution 
is not related to any categorization provided and overall the 
model is inconsistent with either of the two categorizations. 
At the same time we assumed that high NFC participants 
should show an initial benefit in performance (in relation 
to low NFC participants) in the condition where the 
categorization rule is consistent with the nationality of 
presented names. However, when the rule switches to the 
use of a different categorization principle, the advantage of 
high NFC participants should disappear. 
Furthermore, we assumed that participants who score 
high on the decisiveness dimension should freeze quickly on 
the first available solution for the task, without considering 
other possible alternatives. This strategy should lead to an 
even more strongly pronounced effect of categorical cue use 
in task conditions where social cliques can be formed based 
solely on one simple nationality or profession categorization. 
In conditions where such a cue is not valid and a social clique 
cannot be correctly formed based thereon, high (vs. low) 
decisiveness participants should show an increased error 
rate, due to the application of simple decision strategies 
to solving a complex reasoning task. In sum, we expected 
not a qualitative but a quantitative difference between the 
results for the need vs. ability measures of the cognitive 
closure process. Specifically, apart from the motivational 
component, the aspect of cognitive resources (related to 
an increased demand on working memory functions; von 
Hecker & Dutke, 2004) should be very important in the 
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type of reasoning task to be provided to the participants 




The sample consisted of 58 participants, including 43 
women and 15 men with a mean age of 20.82 (SD = 2.11). 
All of them were students of the Warsaw School of Social 
Sciences and Humanities.
The study had a 3 (categorization rule type: nationality, 
profession or none; within participants) x 2 (need for 
closure: high vs. low; between participants) experimental 
design.
Procedure and materials
Participants were asked, after signing an agreement to 
participate in the study, to fill out a Polish version of the 32 
item Need for Closure Scale (Kossowska, 2003; Webster 
& Kruglanski, 1994). The scale consists of five sub-scales: 
1) Preference for order and structure in the environment; 
2) Predictability of future contexts; 3) Affective discomfort 
occasioned by ambiguity; 4) Decisiveness, and 5) Closed-
mindedness. We analyzed the items from the Decisiveness 
scale separately because it has been seen as tapping not so 
much into the motivational aspects as into a general ability 
to achieve cognitive closure (Bar-Tal & Kossowska, 2010; 
Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). Mean scores were calculated 
for the 27 need for closure items and for the 5 items of 
the Decisiveness scale (Cronbach Alpha = .721 and .651, 
respectively).
Background category information
Participants were seated in front of a computer and 
were presented with a cover story telling them about 
an international company that consisted of Polish and 
German engineers and doctors of biology who were given 
the common goal of inventing and developing a new flu 
vaccine. Each person could be therefore classified into one 
of four categories: Polish doctor, Polish engineer, German 
doctor or German engineer; such category membership 
was indicated by the name and title in front of it (e.g., Dr. 
Sławomir or Eng. Klaus). At the same time it was stated 
that when the workers were distributed into teams, some 
team members would come to cooperate with one another, 
others to rival one another. As a consequence, subgroups 
of people who liked each other would form spontaneously. 
Moreover, participants were told that the ensuing tasks 
they would be asked to perform on the computer were 
designed to understand how they would, in their minds, 
divide these people up into smaller subgroups according 
to the information provided on pairwise liking, whereby 
the subgroups could consist of at least two people. As 
mentioned above, people who formed a given relation 
were distinguishable as to their nationality and profession 
by their names and titles (e.g., Dr. Bogdan + Dr. Wolfgang 
means a liking relation between two people belonging to 
two different nationality categories, Polish and German, 
but to the same professional category).
Social clique model construction task
Relations between six fictitious persons were presented 
as individual pairs, with a plus or minus sign between two 
male names, indicating the type of sentiment relations 
between them (liking or disliking). The participant decided 
when the next pair should appear. After the presentation of 
each pair the sign indicating the type of relation between 
two people (“+” for mutual liking, “-” for mutual disliking) 
disappeared but the name pair remained on the screen. 
Eight relations were successively shown, allowing for a 
partitioning of the six persons into either 2 or 3 subgroups 
(cliques).
Two main dependent variables were considered – sorting 
decisions (how many subgroups / social cliques were 
formed) and decisions about the sign (positive or negative) 
of relations previously presented. The first variable can be 
treated as an indicator of how accurately the social clique 
model was formed (von Hecker & Sędek, 1999), whereas the 
second variable can tell us how precisely particular pieces 
of information (i.e. signs of relations between specific pairs 
of names) were coded and retrieved from memory.
Results 
Before starting the analysis all the continuous variables 
were centred. A simple contrast schema was used for the 
dichotomous independent variables (auxiliary variable 
coding: -0.5 and 0.5) and an orthogonal reverted Helmert 
contrast was used for the experimental condition variable. 
The model tested for a difference between the 1st condition 
and 2nd condition (contrast 1; comparison between two 
conditions with clique structure consistent with categorical 
knowledge) and between the average of 1st and 2nd 
conditions on the one hand and the 3rd condition on the other 
(contrast 2; comparison between condition inconsistent with 
categorical knowledge and average from two consistent 
conditions). Interaction terms were computed on the basis 
of centred variables and orthogonal contrasts to ensure that 
there would be no multicollinearity in the data.
Due to the dichotomous character of the dependent 
variables (response accuracy), a multilevel logistic 
regression was chosen to compute estimates of the 
hypothesized model (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Jiang, 2007). 
R package glm (Bates, 2010; R Development Core Team, 
2008) was used for both models: accuracy of decisions 
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about the number of cliques and accuracy of relation sign 
(positive or negative). As concerns the model for the type 
of relation sign (positive or negative) an improvement was 
achieved by taking individual variability into account (AIC 
changed from 1289.6 to 1259.1). Surprisingly, allowing 
effects for experimental conditions to vary between subjects 
also strongly improved model fit (AIC changed from 1259.1 
to 1246.9, chi-square = 22.16, df = 5, p < 0.001). Therefore, 
the experimental condition effect has also been specified as 
a random effect. Variability in effect size proved to be more 
related to contrast 1, which refers to a comparison between 
the 1st and 2nd condition (two conditions consistent with 
categorical knowledge).
The results for the group sorting variable revealed an 
interaction effect close to statistical significance but only 
when the two category consistent conditions were pooled 
together and compared against the category inconsistent 
condition (contrast 2: t = 1.83, p = 0.06; contrast 1: t = 
1.643, p = 0.1) between need for closure and task condition. 
Participants who scored low on NFC (vs. moderate and 
high) made less accurate sorting decisions only in the 
nationality category consistent task condition. This pattern 
was reversed in the category inconsistent condition: low 
NFC participants were the most accurate while high 
NFC participants scored the lowest levels of accuracy. 
In the profession categorization condition no differences 
regarding the need for closure level were observed. The 
results are presented on Figure 1.
We also performed similar analyses for sorting 
decisions with decisiveness as the main independent 
variable. Results showed a very similar pattern as for the 
need for closure scale but the effects were even stronger 
(decisiveness interaction with contrast 1: t = 2.58, p = 
0.01; contrast 2: t = 2.91, p = 0.004) (see Figure 2). People 
who scored high on decisiveness outperformed those 
who scored low in the nationality based categorization 
condition, but underperformed in the condition in which 
social categorization could not be used as an inference 
rule. 
Results for the accuracy of decisions about the sign 
of presented relations between two fictitious people 
revealed that participants who scored high on decisiveness 
performed better than the low decisiveness participants in 
category consistent conditions but performed worse in the 
category inconsistent conditions (t = 3.21, p = 0.001) (see 
Figure 3).
Discussion
These results confirm our main prediction that a 
high level of need for cognitive closure facilitates the 
construction of correct social cliques when there is a simple 
categorization rule that can be used by people in order to 
solve the task (nationality or profession). However, when 
the rule changes to a different one the advantage of high 
NFC participants disappears. Importantly, in task conditions 
where there is no clear and simple categorization rule 
(most of the relation signs are inconsistent with either the 
nationality or the profession categorization), the advantage 
of low need for closure participants grows. This result is 
Figure 3. Accuracy of correct relation sign decisions for presented relations as a 
function of task condition and level of NFC.
Figure 2. Accuracy of decisions regarding the number of social cliques that were 
formed as a function of task condition and the level of decisiveness. 
Figure 1. Accuracy of decisions regarding the number of social cliques that were 
formed as a function of task condition and the level of need for closure. 
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consistent with our previous findings that showed that only 
for the most complex mental model structures do low need 
for closure participants outperform those who show high 
need for closure (Bukowski et al., 2011). It seems also 
that low motivation to achieve closure can act both ways 
– in task settings where decisions about relations between 
people can be made based on simple categorical rules, 
using simple heuristics can help to make a better decision, 
therefore people who score high in NFC perform better 
than low NFC participants. Still, more complex structures 
of relations between people are better recalled by low 
NFC participants. This might be due to a more analytical, 
systematic processing style applied by such participants. 
Therefore, what seems important for performance level in 
the social clique creation process is the fit between the task 
complexity and the strength of the epistemic motivation. 
It is important to notice that the accuracy of decisions 
regarding the number of social cliques, as well as the 
overall accuracy for the relation sign decisions in the 
recall task phase, were more strongly related to the results 
on the decisiveness scale than to the general need for 
closure score. Decisiveness is defined as a tendency to 
make decisions quickly, regardless of their importance, in 
order to simplify the decision making process and be able 
to achieve certainty faster (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
According to more recent findings, decisiveness can be 
considered a separate factor loosely correlated with other 
need for closure facets (Kossowska, Van Hiel, Chun, & 
Kruglanski, 2002) and it also might reflect efficacy in quick 
decision making. Previous research on the relation between 
decisiveness and preferences for various decision making 
strategies shows that high decisiveness is associated with 
greater tendency to simplify the decision process and to use 
non-compensatory decision making strategies (based on the 
value of one attribute and not the integration of information 
from different dimensions) (Wichary, Kossowska, 
Orzechowski, Ślifierz, & Markovic, 2008). Our results that 
relate decisiveness to the accuracy of clique formation are 
consistent with those previous findings. People who score 
high on decisiveness terminate the mental model creation 
process earlier and stick to the first simple structure that 
could serve as a solution for the task provided. In task 
conditions where the clique structure overlaps with the 
simple, category based distribution of people into cliques, 
high decisiveness participants perform better than low 
decisiveness ones. 
This finding is in line with the argument presented by 
Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Group (1999), who claim that 
fast and frugal decisions based on simple decision making 
heuristics are often also the accurate and therefore adaptive 
ones as well. However, the efficacy of these strategies 
might be limited to conditions in which the environment is 
relatively stable and no changes in the social clique structures 
are introduced. In task conditions in which multiple social 
categorizations can serve as a candidate for a correct clique 
structure solution, the difference between high and low 
decisiveness people disappears, and in conditions where 
no categorization can serve as a solution, high decisiveness 
impedes piecemeal processing of the participants (required 
in order to solve the task properly) and consequently 
affects the overall performance level. At the same time low 
decisiveness participants gain an advantage in this situation 
and elevate their level of performance.
The cognitive mechanism underlying these results can 
be better understood when we take into account that high 
decisiveness might narrow one’s working memory capacities 
related to integration of information. From previous 
decision making research we know that lower working 
memory capacity is related to the use of simple decision 
making strategies (Wichary, Orzechowski, Kossowska, 
Ślifierz, Markovic, & Bukowski, 2005). At the same time it 
has been shown that low working memory resources are an 
important factor in the integrative perception of relations in 
a social clique learning task and individuals low in working 
memory benefit more from external representations (von 
Hecker & Dutke, 2004). In the case of our task, background 
social categorizations can be considered external, socially 
shared representations. In the absence of such external 
cues, high decisiveness participants, due to their lowered 
working memory capacities, might have limited abilities 
to apply more complex processing strategies and simplify 
a task in which social categorization is no longer a valid 
cue. 
General Conclusions
This research has shown that people who tend to make 
decisions quickly and do not think about alternative choices 
more than absolutely necessary also tend to “freeze” their 
reasoning process more quickly and rely heavily on the 
available categorical information about social targets. This 
tendency importantly influences their accuracy of reasoning 
about the type of social relations in groups. In contexts that 
provide a clear categorical distribution of the social world, 
such a fast decision making strategy also proves to be the 
accurate one, since additional rumination about alternative 
solutions does not make one’s decision more correct 
but only consumes time and mental effort. However, in 
contexts where categorical rules cannot be applied in order 
to build an accurate representation of relations between 
people, then high decisiveness reveals its disadvantages. 
Those individuals seem to process information in a highly 
selective way, relying almost entirely on the categorical 
background information. Interestingly, it seems that the 
relation between need for closure and reasoning accuracy is 
not so straightforward, since it depends strongly on the type 
of the structure of the social environment. Therefore, high 
need for closure (and especially high decisiveness) may be 
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related to facilitation or impairment of reasoning process 
accuracy, depending on the fit between the complexity level 
of the environment and the particular cognitive processing 
strategy applied in building a mental representation.
This research has also shown that decisiveness is an 
important aspect of epistemic motivation which should 
be considered separately from the whole need for closure 
construct. Decisiveness can be treated as a form of ability or at 
least perceived efficacy in decision making, in contrast to the 
motivational aspect. When decisiveness is conceptualized in 
this way, our results seem be consistent with the predictions 
stemming from the distinction between need and ability 
to achieve cognitive structure (Bar-Tal, 1994; Bar-Tal & 
Kossowska, 2010). It has been previously shown that when 
need for cognitive structure is high and the ability to achieve 
it is high as well, then an increase in stereotyping can be 
observed, whereas stereotyping decreases in low ability 
conditions (Bar-Tal & Guinote, 2002; Kossowska, 2010). 
In the current research we have demonstrated that low 
decisiveness (thus low ability or tendency to make quick 
and spontaneous decisions) can reduce the tendency to 
rely on the first mentally available social categorization. 
Therefore we believe that not only need for closure but also 
decisiveness might have important consequences for social 
information processing. Previous research has shown that the 
Decisiveness scale and the other NFC facet scales correlate 
with conservatism and racism (Roets & Van Hiel, 2006). 
Dechesne, Schultz, Kruglanski, Orehek, & Fishman (2008) 
found that individuals high in need for closure prefer groups 
with impermeable (vs. permeable) boundaries and had 
more negative attitudes toward immigration. In the light 
of these findings and our results, it seems plausible that 
the need for urgency (reflected in the decisiveness aspect 
of the NFC construct) may also influence the creation of 
relatively simple (vs. complex) cognitive representations 
of social relations between people or groups. Specifically, 
the ability to build relatively complex and flexible forms of 
social knowledge should be affected by an elevated level 
of decisiveness.
We believe that further research should examine 
the relation between decisiveness as a relatively stable 
individual difference, task complexity, and working memory 
capacities in order to provide a more precise picture of 
how these constructs are interrelated. Another interesting 
aspect that could be developed based on this study is the 
dynamics of the social clique learning process. In this study 
we provided a task sequence in which an initially learned 
social categorization, which could serve as a rule to solve 
the clique division task, was not valid for subsequent social 
clique distributions. This shifting of categorization rules 
could be a promising measure of cognitive flexibility in the 
domain of social cognition. The relation between epistemic 
motivation and flexibility in rule change conditions appears 
to be an inspiring field for future research.
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